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Introduction 
 
The Microsoft Case is a battle between Microsoft,  the 
global software giant, and the European Commission. 
The Commission found Microsoft to be in breach of Arti-
cle 82 of the EC Treaty because of their refusal to sup-
ply interoperability information in the Work Group Server 
(WGS) market and tying in Windows Media Player 
(WMP) with Windows.  Microsoft appealed to the Euro-
pean Court of First Instance (CFI) where they lost their 
nine year battle on 17 September 2007. Microsoft will 
not be appealing the decision
1
. The case is a modern 
day David and Goliath with the Commission coming out 
the champion. This edition of Law in Brief will look at the 
main outcomes of the decision and  its likely impact in 
particularly on future clashes of competition law and 
intellectual property law within the European Union 
(EU).  
 
What is Article 82? 
 
Article 82 regulates competition law in the common mar-
ket. It prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. For 
Article 82 to apply there has to be an undertaking, i.e.  
an organisation or individual carrying out some kind of 
economic activity, that is in a dominant position. The 
undertaking must then be found to abuse that position
2
 
and the abuse must have the potential to affect trade 
between EU Member States. For an undertaking to be 
dominant it has to have sufficient economic strength to 
act independently of its competitors. There is no exact 
formula for calculating or assessing when an undertak-
ing has sufficient economic strength. Factors taken into 
consideration would include the market share of the un-
dertaking in question and  the market share of its near-
est rivals.  
 
For an undertaking to be dominant for the purpose of 
Article 82 it has to be dominant in the relevant market
3. 
The assessment of relevant product markets was there-
fore essential to the decision in Microsoft. In considering 
the relevant product market two areas need to be exam-
ined carefully. These are the demand-side substitutabil-
ity of the product -  whether customers will switch to an 
identical or similar product - and the supply-side substi-
tutability - whether there are substitute suppliers
4
. In 
other words, the Commission looks at how interchange-
able the product is
5
. The narrower the product market, 
the easier it is for the Commission to find an undertaking 
to be dominant
6
. In the Microsoft case, the Commission 
identified three relevant product markets: PC Operating 
Systems, WGS, and WMP. Microsoft contested domi-
nance in the WGS and WMP markets but admitted domi-
nance in relation to PC Operating Systems.  
 
Market Shares 
 
Once  the  three  separate  product 
markets had been established, the 
Commission had to consider the mar-
ket share held by each product
7
. The 
size of the share is a strong indicator 
of the undertaking’s market power8. 
There is no set cut off for when a 
market share is enough for an under-
taking to be dominant. In PC Operat-
ing Systems, Microsoft holds an over 
90% market share
9
 and is super – 
dominant
10
. In WGS, Microsoft held a 
55 – 60% share11. The nearest com-
petitors were Netware, 10 -25%, Unix and Linux 5 -15%. 
Therefore, there was a presumption of dominance in the 
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WGS market. The barrier to entry to the market for 
WGS was the refusal to supply the required interopera-
bility information; the specific protocols of file, print and 
user administration services
12
. In the third relevant mar-
ket, WMP, the market share was based on WMP being 
tied with Windows and therefore automatically available 
with the purchase of Windows
13
. The Court also consid-
ered the length of time Microsoft had held its market 
shares as a significant factor in making the decision
14
. 
 
 
The Relevant Geographical Market  
 
The application of the Relevant Geographical Market 
(RGM) is based on the notion that for EC Competition 
law to apply there has to be dominance within the com-
mon market or a substantial part of it
15
. The RGM can 
be the whole EU or be limited to a single Member 
State
16
.  For Microsoft  the RGM is the world. Thus, 
where the Commission is in favour of applying very nar-
row definitions of relevant product markets, the opposite 
can be said for the RGM
17
. 
 
WGS: Refusal to Supply v Objective Justifications 
 
The refusal to supply interoperability information by Mi-
crosoft was defined as an anticompetitive abuse
18
. By 
not providing the specifications of the protocols Micro-
soft  is  eliminating the competition (Garrod 2005).  A 
server that does not provide the common necessary 
functions will not be any competition for Microsoft. The 
Commission held that Microsoft’s refusal was eliminat-
ing competition on the work group server operating sys-
tems market. In finding an abuse the Commission or-
dered Microsoft to make the interoperability information 
available, therefore ordered compulsory licensing
19
. The 
objective justification from Microsoft was that it had valid 
patents.  The  Court  assessed  Microsoft’s  intellectual 
property rights against its abuse of a dominant position. 
For this it looked at the Software Directive
20
which deals 
with the legal protection of computer programs. . Micro-
soft’s claim on this was clear, by not upholding their in-
tellectual property rights; the Court would be undermin-
ing the effect of the Directive. The Court however high-
lighted that the Directive was secondary community leg-
islation and therefore did not take priority over Article 
82.  The court specifically referred to recital 27 of the 
directive which states: 
 
Tying of WMP with Windows 
 
Through the tying of WMP with Windows, no version of 
the Windows PC Operating system came without WMP. 
The tying of WMP restricts competition in the media 
players market
21
. The issue arising from this is that the 
tying of WMP was actually the most effective means of 
distribution. The Commission ordered Microsoft to offer 
Windows without WMP, and also highlighted Microsoft 
could not use indirect means to achieve tying, such as 
commercial or contractual means. On appeal the main 
argument by Microsoft was that the Commission had 
failed to show Windows and WMP as being two separate 
products within their own product markets. Microsoft ar-
gued that media player technology was a natural evolu-
tion in the Internet age Also the media player is available 
for free and as such there is no direct economic benefit 
of tying the two products (Dixon 2007). The Commission 
concentrated on Article 82(d) in regard to making conclu-
sions on contracts subject to acceptance of additional 
terms
22
.   The 
key issue for the 
Commission 
was  that  WMP 
was  a  product 
that had its own 
relevant  market 
consumer. As a 
result,  the 
abuse through indirect network effects was upheld on 
appeal.  For Microsoft the tying had the capability of 
negatively effecting competition in the common market 
for media players. The Court found Microsoft’s abusive 
tying started in May 1999. It was found to affect trade 
between member states from this date. 
 
Impact of Decision on Microsoft 
 
Initially the reactions are that this is an exceptional case 
and the ruling is so specific to Microsoft that it does not 
mean a great deal outside the world of Microsoft.  How-
ever the ruling does mean a great deal not only to Micro-
soft but to the I.T sector as a whole and to the CFI as-
serting its stance on upholding Competition law policy in 
the common market over holder of IP rights when the 
two conflict.  
 
The first main effect of the ruling is that the Commission 
will continue to apply very narrow definitions of product 
markets in relation to computer software. Microsoft have 
maintained through their statistical analysis since the 
judgement that there has been no negative effect on its 
trading. The trademark that is Microsoft has such high 
market strength that in looking at the commercial reality 
of the decision very few will say they expected any kind 
of substantial effect on the I.T giant. Microsoft has been 
hurt; the loss is more to do with Microsoft now losing its 
persona of being untouchable (Salkever 2004). It is very 
unlikely there will be a floodgate of challenges against 
Microsoft or indeed other I.T industries. However if Mi-
crosoft had won in its appeal there would have been an 
unsaid rule that Microsoft can never be challenged. In-
stead the ruling means that the Commission is willing to 
take on global multinationals like Microsoft and can win. 
2008/04 
 “the Court ruling confirms the clear prin-
ciples which govern the conduct of such 
dominant companies, and which are de-
signed to protect the competitive proc-
ess and hence consumers”. Neelie 
Kroes, European Commissioner for 
Competition Policy 
“the provisions of this Directive are without prejudice to 
the application of the competition rules under Articles 85 
and 86 of the Treaty if a dominant supplier refuses to 
make information available which is necessary for interop-
erability”  
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 The Commission has shown, where the judgement al-
lows, it will also adjudicate in providing a fair fight for the 
smaller competitors. Microsoft will now face real compe-
tition in the sense that by refusing the interoperability 
information,  it  was not  facing any competition (Bell 
2004). 
 
The ruling in Microsoft does little to further clarify where 
I.T industries stand in relation to competition law 
(Marsden 2007). This is because all rulings in this area 
are geared more towards a case by cases analysis as 
oppose to aiming for certainty and clarity that can pro-
vide a detailed framework for future cases. .  
 
The market definitions in Microsoft are very narrowly 
construed and raise questions on the coherence of a 
competition system (Turney 2005). The narrow defini-
tion of the product markets affects all undertakings in 
the I.T sector. Intellectual Property is a key right for all 
companies. The rights are in patents, design rights, and 
patents. Many technology companies are reluctant to 
disclose specific interoperability information and tying 
products is common practice (Garrod 2005). 
 
The Wider Implications 
 
The  most  important  ef-
fects of the decision are 
on the moral rights of the 
inventor, and on innova-
tion.  This  has  caused 
further tensions between 
Intellectual Property Law 
and Competition Law (Canetti 2004). Prior to Magill, the 
existence – exercise dichotomy was applied to under-
takings with IPR’s. This meant the existence of an IPR 
was not challengeable under competition law, but the 
way it was exercised could be challenged (Fitzgerald 
1998). The change made by the Microsoft decision is 
the existence of an IPR can now be challenged under 
exceptional circumstances. However this undermines 
Intellectual Property Law (Marsden 2007). A patent is a 
national monopoly which is granted in return for the 
publication of the invention. The inventor is rewarded 
with an exclusive right and innovation is encouraged 
(Korah 2006). Recent decisions by the ECJ have fo-
cused on a balancing of IPR’s and Competition Law23. 
The problem that arises for IPR holders is when the 
Commission will apply a narrow market definition then 
the market share will be high as the through the IPR, 
the holder has a legal monopoly (Vrins 2001). There-
fore, the likelihood of being found dominant in the prod-
uct market is very high. 
 
The second effect of the decision is on innovation. Mi-
crosoft was unsuccessful in arguing the decision had a 
negative impact on their incentive to innovate. Never-
theless, the IP rights in question obviously have some 
value; otherwise rivals would invent them themselves
(Marsden 2007). By ordering compulsory licensing, the 
Commission is taking away certain rights from Microsoft. 
If the principles behind Intellectual Property Law are con-
sidered then a distinction can be drawn between Micro-
soft’s rights and the encouragement of innovation. By 
ordering compulsory licensing, the Commission are first 
of all giving competitors a level playing field and sec-
ondly by giving the smaller competitors a level footing, 
the Commission are in fact encouraging innovation. The 
problem for Microsoft is the innovation might not be by 
them as whereas the smaller competitors were trying to 
catch up to Microsoft, they can now invest in further in-
novations. 
The wider implications raise serious concerns on the 
conflict  of  Intellectual  Property Law and Competition 
Law. The two areas of law cannot be easily reconciled. 
Whereas the CFI have made a landmark Competition 
Law case in finding Microsoft to be abusing a dominant 
position,  in  Re Astron Clinica Ltd
24
,  the High Court 
broadened the circumstances under which a computer 
program can be granted a patent. This is very significant. 
In Re Astron a category that was previously exempt from 
patent protection was given the right to be patented. 
Therefore, if both Intellectual Property Law and Competi-
tion Law continually broaden their application of the re-
spective law, there can only be more cases involving a 
conflict between the two. 
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